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Abstract
In evolutionary game theory an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS)
is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept that is sometimes also rec-
ognized as evolutionary stability. It is a game-theoretic model, well known
to mathematical biologists, that was found quite useful in the understand-
ing of evolutionary dynamics of a population. This chapter presents an
analysis of evolutionary stability in the emerging field of quantum games.
∗Permanent address: Centre for Advanced Mathematics and Physics, National Univer-
sity of Sciences & Technology, Campus of College of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering,
Peshawar Road, Rawalpindi, Pakistan.
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1 Introduction
Games such as chess, warfare and politics have been played throughout history.
Whenever individuals meet who have conflicting desires, and priorities, then
games are likely to be played. Analysis and understanding of games has existed
for long times but the emergence of game theory as a formal study of games is
widely believed to have taken place when Neumann and Morgenstern [1] pub-
lished their pioneering book “The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour”
in 1944. Game theory [2] is now an established discipline of mathematics that
is a vast subject having a rich history and content. Roughly speaking, game
theory is the analysis of the actions made by rational players when these actions
are strategically interdependent.
The 1970s saw game theory being successfully applied to problems of evo-
lutionary biology and a new branch of game theory, recognized as evolutionary
game theory [3, 4, 5], came into existence. The concept of utility from eco-
nomics was given an interpretation in terms of Darwinian fitness . Originally,
evolutionary game theory considered animal conflicts occurring in macro-world.
In recent years, research in biology [6] suggested that nature also plays classi-
cal games at micro-level. Bacterial infections by viruses are classical game-like
situations where nature prefers dominant strategies .
In game theory [1, 2] one finds many examples where multiple Nash equilibria
(NE) [7, 8] emerge as solutions of a game. To select one (or possibly more) out
of these requires some refinement of the equilibrium concept [9]. A refinement
is a rule/criterion that describes the criterion to prefer one (in some cases more
than one) equilibrium out of many. Numerous refinements are found in game
theory, for example, perfect equilibrium (used for extensive- and normal-form
games), sequential equilibrium (a fundamental non-cooperative solution con-
cept for extensive-form games), and correlated equilibrium (used for modelling
communication among players).
During recent years quantum game theory [10, 11, 12] has emerged as a new
research field within quantum information and computation [13]. A significant
portion of research in quantum games deals with the question asking how quan-
tization of a game affects/changes the existence/location of a NE. This question
has been addressed in a number of publications [14] in this area and now it seems
that it is generally agreed that quantization of a game indeed affects/changes
the existence/location of a NE.
In this chapter we argue that, like asking how quantization of a game af-
fects/changes the existence/location of a NE, an equally important question for
quantum games is to ask how quantization of a game can affect a refinement of
the NE concept. We notice that a particular refinement of the NE, known as an
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS ), is central to evolutionary game theory
. While focussing on a this refinement, we motivate those quantum games in
which a NE persists1 in both of its classical and quantum versions while its
1By saying that a NE persists in both the classical and quantum version of a game we
mean that there exists a NE consisting of quantum strategies that rewards both the players
exactly the same the corresponding NE does in the classical version of the game.
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property of being an ESS survives in either classical or its quantum version, but
not in the both. We argue that, the quantum games offering such situations,
along with their quantization procedures, can justifiably be said to extend the
boundary of investigations in quantum games from existence/location of NE to
existence/location of one (or more) of its refinements.
2 Evolutionary game theory and evolutionary
stability
The roots of evolutionary game theory [5] can be traced to the puzzle of the
approximate equality of the sex ratio in mammals. In 1930 Fisher ( [15, 16])
noticed that if individual fitness is defined in terms of the expected number of
grandchildren, then it becomes dependent on how males and females are dis-
tributed in a population. Fisher showed that the evolutionary dynamics then
leads to the sex ratio becoming fixed at equal numbers of males and females.
Although Fisher’s argument can be recast in game-theoretic language but orig-
inally it was not presented in those terms. Perhaps it was due to the fact that
until that time modern game theory had not yet emerged as a formal study of
games.
Modern game theory was used, for the first time, to understand evolution
when in 1972 Maynard Smith and G. R. Price introduced the concept of an
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) [17, 3]. Presently, this concept is widely
believed to be the cornerstone of evolutionary game theory [4] and has been
found quite useful to explain and understand animal behavior.
Traditionally, game theory had concerned analyzing interactions among hy-
perrational players and the idea that it can be applied to animals seemed strange
at the time. The ESS concept made three important changes in the traditional
meaning of the concepts of a) strategy, b) equilibrium, and c) players’ interac-
tions.
a) Strategy : In traditional game theory, players have strategy set from
which they choose their strategies. In biology, animals belonging to a species
have strategy sets that are genotypic variants that may be mutated, of which in-
dividuals inherit one or another variant, which they then play in their strategic
interactions. A mixed strategy in game theory means a convex linear combina-
tion (with real and normalized coefficients) of pure strategies. Because genotypic
variants are taken as pure strategies, the evolutionary game theory interprets
a mixed strategy in terms of proportion of the population that is playing that
strategy.
b) Equilibrium : An ESS represents an equilibrium and it is a strategy
having the property that if a whole population plays it, it cannot be invaded
under the influence of natural selection , by a small group of players playing
mutant strategies. Because strategies of evolutionary games are genotypes the
ESS definition takes the following form: If adapted by a whole population an
ESS is a genotype that cannot be invaded by another genotype when it appears
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in a small fraction of the total population.
c) Player interactions : The ESS concept is about repeated and random
pairing of players who play strategies based on their genome and not on the
previous history of play. This approach was new to the usual approach of one-
shot and repeated games of classical game theory .
Consider a large population [5, 4] in which members are matched repeatedly
and randomly in pairs to play a bi-matrix game . The players are anonymous,
that is, any pair of players plays the same symmetric bi-matrix game . The
symmetry of a bi-matrix game means that for a strategy set S Alice’s payoff
when she plays S1 ∈ S and Bob plays S2 ∈ S is the same as Bob’s payoff when
he plays S1 and Alice plays S2. Hence, a player’s payoff is defined by his/her
strategy and not by his/her identity and an exchange of strategies by the two
players also exchanges their respective payoffs. A symmetric bi-matrix game is
represented by an expression G = (M,MT ) where M is the first player’s payoff
matrix and MT , being its transpose, is the second players’ payoff matrix . In
a symmetric pair-wise contest one can write P (x, y) as being the payoff to a
x-player against a y-player.
To be precise [4, 18, 19] a strategy x is said to be an ESS if:
a) for each mutant strategy y there exists a positive invasion barrier .
b) if the population share of individuals playing the mutant strategy y falls
below the invasion barrier, then x earns a higher expected payoff than y.
Mathematically speaking [5, 4] x is an ESS when for each strategy y 6= x the
inequality
P [x, (1− ǫ)x+ ǫy] > P [y, (1− ǫ)x+ ǫy] (1)
holds for all sufficiently small ǫ > 0. In (1) the expression on the left-hand side
is payoff to the strategy x when played against the mixed strategy (1 − ǫ)x +
ǫy. This condition for an ESS is shown [17, 3, 5] equivalent to the following
requirements:
a) P (x, x) > P (y, x)
b) If P (x, x) = P (y, x) then P (x, y) > P (y, y). (2)
It turns out [3, 5] that an ESS is a symmetric NE that is stable against small
mutations. Condition a) in the definition (2) shows (x, x) is a NE for the bi-
matrix game G = (M,MT ) if x is an ESS . However, the converse is not true.
That is, if (x, x) is a NE then x is an ESS only if x satisfies condition b) in
definition (2).
Evolutionary game theory defines the concept of fitness [20] of a strategy as
follows. Suppose x and y are pure strategies played by a population of players
that is engaged in a two-player game. Their fitnesses are
W (x) = P (x, x)Fx + P (x, y)Fy ; W (y) = P (y, x)Fx + P (y, y)Fy (3)
4
where Fx and Fy are frequencies (the relative proportions) of the pure strategies
x and y respectively.
It turned out that an ESS is a refinement on the set of symmetric Nash
equilibria [5, 21]. For symmetric bi-matrix games this relationship is described
[22] as △ESS ⊂ △PE ⊂ △NE where △PE 6= Φ and △NE, △PE , △ESS are the
sets of symmetric NE, symmetric proper equilibrium, and ESSs respectively.
The property of an ESS of being robust against small mutations is also re-
ferred to as evolutionary stability [18, 19]. This concept provided a significant
part of the motivation for later developments in evolutionary game theory . In
evolutionary game theory, the Darwinian natural selection is formulated as an
algorithm called replicator dynamics [4, 5] which is a mathematical statement
saying that in a population the proportion of players playing better strategies
increases with time. Mathematically, ESSs come out as the rest points of repli-
cator dynamics [4, 5].
Evolutionary stability was found to be a useful concept because it says some-
thing about the dynamic properties of a system without being committed to a
particular dynamic model. Sometimes, it is also described as a model of ratio-
nality which is physically grounded in natural selection .
2.1 Population setting of evolutionary game theory
Evolutionary game theory introduces so-called the population setting [5, 4] that
is also known as population-statistical setting . This setting assumes a) an in-
finite population of players who are engaged in random pair-wise contests b)
each player being programmed to play only one strategy and c) an evolutionary
pressure ensuring that better-performing strategies have better chances of sur-
vival at the expense of other competing strategies. Because of b) one can refer
to better-performing players as better-performing strategies.
The population setting of evolutionary game theory is not alien to the con-
cept of the NE, although it may give such an impression. In fact, John Nash
himself had this setting in his mind when he introduced this concept in game
theory. In his unpublished Ph.D. thesis [23, 4] he wrote ‘it is unnecessary to as-
sume that the participants have...the ability to go through any complex reasoning
process. But the participants are supposed to accumulate empirical information
on the various pure strategies at their disposal...We assume that there is a pop-
ulation...of participants...and that there is a stable average frequency with which
a pure strategy is employed by the “average member” of the appropriate popula-
tion’.
That is, Nash had suggested a population interpretation of the NE concept
in which players are randomly drawn from large populations. Nash assumed
that these players were not aware of the total structure of the game and did
not have either the ability nor inclination to go through any complex reasoning
process.
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3 Quantum games
This chapter considers evolutionary stability in quantum games that are played
in the two quantization schemes: Eisert, Wilkens, Lewenstein (EWL) scheme
[11, 12] for playing quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) andMarinatto andWeber
(MW) scheme [24] for playing quantum Battle of Sexes (BoS) game.
EWL quantization scheme appeared soon after Meyer’s publication [10] of
the PQ penny-flip – a quantum game that generated significant interest and is
widely believed to have led to the creation of the new research field of quantum
games . MW scheme derives from EWL scheme but it gives a different meaning
to the term ‘strategy’ [25, 26].
EWL quantum PD assigns two basis vectors |C〉 and |D〉 in the Hilbert
space of a qubit . States of the two qubits belong to two-dimensional Hilbert
spaces HA and HB , respectively. The state of the game is defied as being a
vector residing in the tensor-product space HA ⊗ HB, spanned by the basis
|CC〉 , |CD〉 , |DC〉 and |DD〉. Game’s initial state is |ψini〉 = Jˆ |CC〉 where Jˆ
is a unitary operator known to both the players. Alice’s and Bob’s strategies
are unitary operations UˆA and UˆB, respectively, chosen from a strategic space S¸.
After players’ actions the state of the game changes to UˆA⊗ UˆBJˆ |CC〉. Finally,
the state is measured and it consists of applying reverse unitary operator Jˆ†
followed by a pair of Stern-Gerlach type detectors . Before detection the final
state of the game is |ψfin〉 = Jˆ†UˆA ⊗ UˆBJˆ |CC〉. Players’ expected payoffs are
the projections of the state |ψfin〉 onto the basis vectors of tensor-product space
HA⊗HB, weighed by the constants appearing in the following game matrix (4).
Alice
C
D
Bob
C D(
(r, r) (s, t)
(t, s) (u, u)
)
(4)
where C and D are the classical strategies of Cooperation and Defection, re-
spectively. The first and the second entry in small braces correspond to Alice’s
and Bob’s (classical, pure strategy) payoffs, respectively. When s < u < r < t
the matrix (4) represents PD. In EWL quantum PD Alice’s payoff, for example,
reads
PA = r |〈CC | ψfin〉|2 + s |〈CD | ψfin〉|2 + t |〈DC | ψfin〉|2 + u |〈DD | ψfin〉|2 .
(5)
With reference to the matrix (4) Bob’s payoff is, then, obtained by the trans-
formation s ⇄ t in Eq. (5). Eisert and Wilkens [12] used following matrix
representations of unitary operators of their one- and two-parameter strate-
gies, respectively:
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U(θ) =
(
cos(θ/2) sin(θ/2)
- sin(θ/2) cos(θ/2)
)
(6)
U(θ, φ) =
(
eiφ cos(θ/2) sin(θ/2)
- sin(θ/2) e−iφ cos(θ/2)
)
(7)
where
0 ≤ θ ≤ π and 0 ≤ φ ≤ π/2. (8)
To ensure that the classical game is faithfully represented in its quantum version,
EWL imposed an additional conditions on Jˆ :[
Jˆ , Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ
]
= 0,
[
Jˆ , Dˆ ⊗ Cˆ
]
= 0,
[
Jˆ , Cˆ ⊗ Dˆ
]
= 0 (9)
with Cˆ and Dˆ being the operators corresponding to the classical strategies C
and D, respectively. A unitary operator satisfying the condition (9) is
Jˆ = exp
{
iγDˆ ⊗ Dˆ/2
}
(10)
where γ ∈ [0, π/2] and Jˆ represents a measure of the game’s entanglement . At
γ = 0 the game can be interpreted as a mixed-strategy classical game. For a
maximally entangled game γ = π/2 the classical NE of Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ is replaced by
a different unique equilibrium Qˆ ⊗ Qˆ where Qˆ ∼ Uˆ(0, π/2). This new equilib-
rium is found also to be Pareto optimal [2], that is, a player cannot increase
his/her payoff by deviating from this pair of strategies without reducing the
other player’s payoff. Classically (C,C) is Pareto optimal, but is not an equilib-
rium [2], thus resulting in the ‘dilemma’ in the game. It is argued [27, 28] that
in its quantum version the dilemma disappears from the game and quantum
strategies give a superior performance if entanglement is present.
MW quantization scheme [24, 25, 26] for BoS identifies a state in 2 ⊗ 2
dimensional Hilbert space as a strategy. At the start of the game the players
are supplied with this strategy and the players manipulate the strategy in the
next phase by playing their tactics. The state is finally measured and payoffs
are rewarded depending on the results of the measurement. A player can do
actions within a two-dimensional subspace. Tactics are therefore local actions
on a player’s qubit. The final measurement, made independently on each qubit ,
takes into consideration the local nature of players’ manipulations. This is done
by selecting a measurement basis that respects the division of Hilbert space into
two equal parts.
Essentially MW scheme differs from EWL scheme [11, 12] in the absence of
reverse gate2 J†. Finally, the quantum state is measured and it is found that
the classical game remains a subset of the quantum game if the players’ tactics
2EWL introduced the gate J† before measurement takes place that makes sure that the
classical game remains a subset of its quantum version.
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Figure 1: EWL scheme to play a quantum game.
are limited to a convex linear combination, with real coefficients, of applying
the identity Iˆ and the Pauli spin-flip operator σˆx. Classical game results when
the players are forwarded an initial strategy |ψin〉 = |00〉.
Let ρin be the initial strategy the players Alice and Bob receive at the start of
the game. Assume Alice acts with identity Iˆ on ρin with probability p and with
σˆx with probability (1− p). Similarly, Bob act with identity Iˆ with probability
q and with σˆx with probability (1− q). After players’ actions the state changes
to
ρfin = pqIˆA ⊗ IˆBρinIˆ†A ⊗ Iˆ†B + p(1− q)IˆA ⊗ σˆxBρinIˆ†A ⊗ σˆ†xB+
q(1− p)σˆxA ⊗ IˆBρinσˆ†xA ⊗ Iˆ†B+
(1− p)(1− q)σˆxA ⊗ σˆxBρinσˆ†xA ⊗ σˆ†xB. (11)
When the game is given by the bi-matrix:
Alice
S1
S2
Bob
S1 S2(
(αA, αB) (βA, βB)
(γA, γB) (δA, δB)
)
(12)
the payoff operators are:
(PA)oper = αA |00〉 〈00|+ βA |01〉 〈01|+ γA |10〉 〈10|+ δA |11〉 〈11|
(PB)oper = αB |00〉 〈00|+ βB |01〉 〈01|+ γB |10〉 〈10|+ δB |11〉 〈11| . (13)
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and payoff functions are then obtained as mean values of these operators:
PA,B = Tr {(PA,B)operρfin} . (14)
It is to be pointed out that in EWL set-up a quantum game corresponds
when the entanglement parameter γ of the initial quantum state is different
from zero. When γ is non-zero the players have strategies available to them
that result in the classical game. The general idea is to allow a range of values
to the parameter γ and then to find how it leads to a different, i.e. non-classical,
equilibrium in the game.
In MW scheme [24, 25, 26] an initial strategy is forwarded to two players
who then apply their tactics on it and the classical game corresponds to the
initial state |00〉. Assume now that the players receive pure two-qubit states,
different from |00〉, and the measurement remains the same. A quantum form
of the game then corresponds if initial states different from the product state
|00〉 are used. This translates finding quantum form of a matrix game to finding
appropriate initial state(s). This is justified because the only restriction [26] on
a quantum form of a game being that the corresponding classical game must be
reproducible as its special case. As the product initial state |00〉 always results
in the classical game, this approach remains within the mentioned restriction.
In EWL scheme one looks for new equilibria in games in relation to the
parameter γ. In the above approach, however, one finds equilibria in relation to
different initial states. In this chapter, we will restrict ourselves to pure states
only.
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4 Evolutionary stability in quantum games
The concept of a NE was addressed in the earliest research publications in quan-
tum games [11, 12]. Analysis of this solution concept from non-cooperative game
theory generated significant interest in the new research field. These publica-
tions do not explicitly refer to the population interpretation of the NE concept.
In fact, this possibility of this interpretation was behind the development of
the ESS concept in evolutionary game theory. And when this interpretation is
brought within the domain of quantum games it becomes natural to consider
ESSs in this domain.
One may ask how and where the population setting may be relevant to quan-
tum games . How can a setting, originally developed to model the population
biology problems, be relevant and useful to quantum games ? One can often
sharpen this argument given the fact that, to date, almost all of the experimen-
tal realizations of quantum games are artificially constructed in laboratories
using quantum computational circuits [13].
Several replies can be made to this question, for example, that this setting
was behind the development of the NE concept that was addressed in the earliest
constructions of quantum games attracting significant attention. One also finds
that evolutionary stability has very rich literature in game theory, mathematical
biology and in evolutionary economics [29, 30]. In quantum games the NE has
been discussed in relation to quantum entanglement [13] and the possibility that
the same can be done with evolutionary stability clearly opens a new interesting
role for this quantum phenomenon. It is conjectured that the possibility of this
extended role for entanglement may perhaps be helpful to better understand
entanglement itself.
Evolutionary stability presents a game-theoretic model to understand evolu-
tionary dynamics. Recent developments in quantum games motivate to ask how
this game-theoretic solution concept adapts/shapes/changes itself when players
are given access to quantum strategies . This questions is clearly related to a
bigger question: Can quantum mechanics have a role in directing, or possibly
dictating, the dynamics of evolution? We believe that for an analysis along
this direction the evolutionary stability offers an interesting situation because,
firstly, it is a simple and a beautiful concept and, secondly, it is supported by
extensive literature [18, 4].
To discuss evolutionary stability in quantum games may appear as if a con-
cept originally developed for population biology problems is arbitrarily being
placed within the domain of quantum games. One can reply to this by noticing
that population biology is not the only relevant domain for the concept of evolu-
tionary stability . This concept can also be interpreted using infinitely repeated
two-player games and without referring to a population of players. Secondly, as
the Nash’s thesis [23, 4] showed it, it is not the population biology alone that
motivates a population setting for game theory – responsible for the concept
of evolutionary stability . Surprisingly, the concept of NE also does the same,
although it may not be recognized generally.
The usual approach in game theory consists of analyzing games among
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hyper-rational players who are always found both ready and engaged in their
selfish interests to optimize their payoffs or utilities. Evolutionary stability has
roots in the efforts to get rid of this usual approach that game theory had fol-
lowed. The lesson it teaches is that playing games can be disassociated from
players’ capacity to make rational decisions. This disassociation seems equally
valid in those possible situations where nature plays quantum games 3. It is be-
cause associating rationality to quantum-interacting entities is of even a more
remote possibility than it is the case when this association is made to bacteria
and viruses, whose behavior evolutionary game theory explains.
In the following we will try to address the following questions: How ESSs
are affected when a classical game, played by a population, changes itself to a
quantum form? How pure and mixed ESSs are distinguished from one another
when such a change in the form of a game takes place? Can quantum games
provide a route that can relate evolutionary dynamics, for example, to quantum
entanglement ? Considering a population of players in which a classical strategy
has established itself as an ESS , we would like to ask: a) What happens when
‘mutants’ of ESS theory come up with quantum strategies and try to invade
the classical ESS? b) What happens if such an invasion is successful and a new
ESS is established – an ESS that is quantum in nature? c) Suppose afterwards
another small group of mutants appears which is equipped with some other
quantum strategy . Will it successfully invade the quantum ESS?
4.1 Evolutionary stability in EWL scheme
EWL used the matrix (4) with r = 3, s = 0, t = 5, and u = 1 in their proposal
for quantum PD. Assume a population setting where in each pair-wise encounter
the players play PD with the same matrix and each contest is symmetric. Which
strategies will then be likely to be stable? Straightforward analysis [20] shows
that D will be the pure classical strategy prevalent in the population and hence
the classical ESS. We consider following three cases:
Case (a) A small group of mutants appear equipped with one-parameter
quantum strategy Uˆ(θ) when D exists as a classical ESS
Case (b) Mutants are equipped with two-parameter quantum strategy Uˆ(θ, φ)
against the classical ESS
Case (c) Mutants have successfully invaded and a two-parameter quantum
strategy Qˆ ∼ Uˆ(0, π/2) has established itself as a new quantum ESS. Again an-
other small group of mutants appear, using some other two-parameter quantum
strategy, and tries to invade the quantum ESS, which is Qˆ.
Case (a): Because players are anonymous one can represent P (Uˆ(θ), D) as the
payoff to Uˆ(θ)-player against the D-player. Here Uˆ(θ) is the Eisert and Wilkens’
one-parameter quantum strategy set (6). Players’ payoffs read P (Uˆ(θ), D) =
sin2(θ/2); P (Uˆ(θ), Uˆ(θ)) = 2 cos2(θ/2)+5 cos2(θ/2) sin2(θ/2)+1; P (D, Uˆ(θ)) =
3Although, no evidence showing nature playing quantum games has been found to date,
the idea itself does not seem far-fetched.
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5 cos2(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2); and P (D,D) = 1. Now P (D,D) > P (Uˆ(θ), D) for all
θ ∈ [0, π). Hence the first condition for an ESS holds and D ∼ Uˆ(π) is an ESS.
The case θ = π corresponds to one-parameter mutant strategy coinciding with
the ESS, which is ruled out. If D ∼ Uˆ(π) is played by almost all the members
of the population – which corresponds to high frequency FD for D – we then
have W (D) > W (θ) for all θ ∈ [0, π) using the definition (3). The fitness of
a one-parameter quantum strategy4, therefore, cannot exceed the fitness of a
classical ESS. And a one-parameter quantum strategy cannot invade a classical
ESS.
Case (b): Let Uˆ(θ, φ) be a two-parameter strategy from the set (7). The
expected payoffs read P (D,D) = 1; P (D, Uˆ(θ, φ)) = 5 cos2(φ) cos2(θ/2) +
sin2(θ/2); P (Uˆ(θ, φ), D) = 5 sin2(φ) cos2(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2); and
P (Uˆ(θ, φ), Uˆ (θ, φ)) = 3
∣∣cos(2φ) cos2(θ/2)∣∣2
+ 5 cos2(θ/2) sin2(θ/2) |sin(φ)− cos(φ)|2
+
∣∣sin(2φ) cos2(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2)∣∣2 . (15)
Here P (D,D) > P (Uˆ(θ, φ), D) if φ < arcsin(1/
√
5) and if P (D,D) = P (Uˆ(θ, φ), D)
then P (D, Uˆ(θ, φ)) > P (Uˆ(θ, φ), Uˆ (θ, φ)). Therefore, D is an ESS if φ <
arcsin(1/
√
5) otherwise the strategy Uˆ(θ, φ) will be in position to invade D.
Alternatively, if most of the members of the population play D ∼ Uˆ(π, 0) –
which means a high frequency FD for D – then the fitness W (D) will remain
greater than the fitness W [Uˆ(θ, φ)] if φ < arcsin(1/
√
5). For φ > arcsin(1/
√
5)
the strategy Uˆ(θ, φ) can invade the strategy D, which is the classical ESS.
In this analysis mutants are able to invade D when φ > arcsin(1/
√
5) and
the invasion may seem not so unusual given the fact that they exploit richer
strategies. But it leads to the third case i.e. when ‘quantum mutants ’ have
successfully invaded and a two-parameter strategy Uˆ has established itself. Can
now some new mutants coming up with Qˆ ∼ Uˆ(0, π/2) and invade the ‘quantum
ESS’?
Case (c): EWL [11, 12] showed that in their quantum PD the quantum strat-
egy Qˆ, played by both the players, is the unique NE. How mutants playing Qˆ
come up against Uˆ(θ, φ) which already exists as an ESS? To find it the following
payoffs are obtained. P (Qˆ, Qˆ) = 3; P (Uˆ(θ, φ), Qˆ) = [3 − 2 cos2(φ)] cos2(θ/2);
and P (Qˆ, Uˆ(θ, φ)) = [3 − 2 cos2(φ)] cos2(θ/2) + 5 sin2(θ/2). Now the inequality
P (Qˆ, Qˆ) > P (Uˆ(θ, φ), Qˆ) holds for all θ ∈ [0, π] and φ ∈ [0, π/2] except when
θ = 0 and φ = π/2, which is the case when the mutant strategy Uˆ(θ, φ) is the
same as Qˆ. This case is obviously ruled out. The first condition for Qˆ to be
an ESS, therefore, holds. The condition P (Qˆ, Qˆ) = P (Uˆ(θ, φ), Qˆ) implies θ = 0
4In EWL set-up one-parameter quantum strategies correspond to mixed (randomized)
classical strategies.
12
and φ = π/2. Again we have the situation of mutant strategy same as Qˆ and
the case is neglected. If Qˆ is played by most of the players, meaning high fre-
quency F
Qˆ
for Qˆ, then W (Qˆ) > W [Uˆ(θ, φ)] for all θ ∈ (0, π] and φ ∈ [0, π/2). A
two-parameter quantum strategy Uˆ(θ, φ), therefore, cannot invade the quantum
ESS (i.e. the strategy Qˆ ∼ Uˆ(0, π/2)). Mutants’ access to richer strategies, as
it happens in the case (B), does not continue to be an advantage as most of the
population also have access to it. Hence Qˆ comes out as the unique NE and
ESS of the game.
4.1.1 Evolutionary stability and entanglement
Above analysis motivates to obtain a direct relationship between a measure of
entanglement and the mathematical concept of evolutionary stability for two-
player games. The following example shows this relationship. Consider the
two-player game given by the matrix (16):
Alice
S1
S2
Bob
S1 S2(
(r, r) (s, t)
(t, s) (u, u)
)
(16)
and suppose Alice and Bob play the strategy S1 with probabilities p and q,
respectively. The strategy S2 is then played with probabilities (1 − p) and
(1 − q) by Alice and Bob, respectively. We denote Alice’s payoff by PA(p, q)
when she plays p and Bob plays q. That is, Alice’s and Bob’s strategies are now
identified by the numbers p, q ∈ [0, 1], without referring to S1 and S2. For the
matrix (16) Alice’s payoff PA(p, q), for example, reads
PA(p, q) = rpq + sp(1− q) + t(1− p)q + u(1− p)(1 − q). (17)
Similarly, Bob’s payoff PB(p, q) can be written. In this symmetric game we
have PA(p, q) = PB(q, p) and, without using subscripts, P (p, q), for example,
describes the payoff to p-player against q-player. In this game the inequality
P (p∗, p∗)− P (p, p∗) > 0 (18)
says that the strategy p∗, played by both the players, is a NE. We consider the
case when
s = t, r = u and (r − t) > 0 (19)
in the matrix (16). In this case the inequality (18) along with the definition
(17) gives
P (p∗, p∗)− P (p, p∗) = (p∗ − p)(r − t)(2p∗ − 1) (20)
and the strategy p∗ = 1/2 comes out as a mixed NE. From the ESS definition
(2) we get P (1/2, 1/2)−P (p, 1/2) = 0 and the part a) of the definition does not
apply. Part b) of the definition (2), then, gives
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P (1/2, p)− P (p, p) = (r − t) {2p(1− p)− 1/2} (21)
which can not be strictly greater than zero given (r−t) > 0. For example, at p =
0 it becomes a negative quantity. Therefore, for the matrix game defined by (16)
and (19) the strategy p∗ = 1/2 is a symmetric NE, but it is not evolutionarily
stable. Also, at this equilibrium both players get (r + t)/2 as their payoffs.
Now consider the same game, defined by (16) and (19), when it is played
by the set-up proposed by EWL. We set sA ≡ (θA, φA) and sB ≡ (θB, φB) to
denote Alice’s and Bob’s strategies, respectively. Because the quantum game is
symmetric i.e. PA(sA, sB) = PB(sB, sA) we can write, as before, P (sA, sB) for
the payoff to sA-player against sB-player. For the quantum form of the game
defined by (16,19) one finds
P (sA, sB) = (1/2)(r−t) {1 + cos θA cos θB + sin θA sin θB sin γ sin(φA + φB)}+t.
(22)
The definition of a NE gives P (s∗, s∗) − P (s, s∗) > 0 where s = (θ, φ) and
s∗ = (θ∗, φ∗). This definition can be written as
{∂θP |θ∗,φ∗ (θ∗ − θ) + ∂φP |θ∗,φ∗ (φ∗ − φ)} ≥ 0. (23)
We search for a quantum strategy s∗ = (θ∗, φ∗) for which both ∂θP |θ∗,φ∗ and
∂φP |θ∗,φ∗ vanish at γ = 0 and which, at some other value of γ, is not zero. For
the payoffs (22) the strategy s∗ = (π/2, π/4) satisfies these conditions. For this
strategy Eq. (22) gives
P (s∗, s∗)− P (s, s∗) = (1/2)(r − t) sin γ {1− sin(φ+ π/4) sin θ} . (24)
At γ = 0 the strategy s∗ = (π/2, π/4), when played by both the players, is a NE
and it rewards the players same as does the strategy p∗ = 1/2 in the classical
version of the game i.e. (r + t)/2. Also, then we have P (s∗, s∗) − P (s, s∗) = 0
from Eq. (24) and the ESS’s second condition in (2) applies. Use Eq. (22) to
evaluate
P (s∗, s)− P (s, s) = −(r − t) cos2(θ)+
(1/2)(r − t) sin γ sin θ {sin(φ+ π/4)− sin θ sin(2φ)} (25)
which at γ = 0 reduces to P (s∗, s)−P (s, s) = −(r− t) cos2(θ), that can assume
negative values. The game’s definition (19) and the ESS’s second condition in
(2) show that the strategy s∗ = (π/2, π/4) is not evolutionarily stable at γ = 0.
Now consider the case when γ 6= 0 in order to know about the evolutionary
stability of the same quantum strategy. From (8) we have both sin θ, sin(φ +
π/4) ∈ [0, 1] and Eq. (24) indicates that s∗ = (π/2, π/4) remains a NE for
all γ ∈ [0, π/2]. The product sin(φ + π/4) sin θ attains a value of 1 only at
s∗ = (π/2, π/4) and remains less than 1 otherwise. Eq. (24) shows that for
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γ 6= 0 the strategy s∗ = (π/2, π/4) becomes a strict NE for which the ESS’s
first condition in (2) applies. Therefore, for the game defined in (19) the strategy
s∗ = (π/2, π/4) is evolutionarily stable for a non-zero measure of entanglement
γ. That is, entanglement gives evolutionary stability to a symmetric NE by
making it a strict NE, that is, it is achieved by using in (2) the ESS’s first
condition only. Perhaps, a more interesting example would be the case when
entanglement gives evolutionary stability via the ESS’s second condition. In
that case, entanglement will make P (s∗, s) strictly greater than P (s, s) when
P (s∗, s∗) and P (s, s∗) are equal.
It is to be pointed out here that in literature there exists an approach [31]
which characterizes ESSs in terms of extremal states of a function known as
evolutionary entropy that is defined by
E = −
∑
i
µi logµi (26)
where µi represents the relative contribution of the i-th strategy to the total
payoff. A possible extension of the present approach may be the case when
quantum entanglement decides extremal states of evolutionary entropy. Ex-
tension along similar lines can be proposed for another quantity called relative
negentropy [18] that is optimized during the course of evolution.
4.2 Evolutionary stability in MW quantization scheme
Another interesting route that allows to consider evolutionary stability in re-
lation to quantization of a game is provided by MW scheme [24]. In this
scheme a transition between classical and quantum game is achieved by the
initial state: classical payoffs are obtained when the initial state is a product
state |ψin〉 = |00〉. In this scheme one can consider evolutionary stability in a
quantum game by asking whether it possible that a particular symmetric NE
switches-over between being an ESS and not being an ESS when the initial state
(initial strategy) changes from being |ψin〉 = |00〉 to another state. MW scheme
offers the possibility to make transition from classical to quantum version of
a game by using different initial states and it appears to be a more suitable
quantization scheme to analyze evolutionary stability in quantum games. It is
because:
a) In a symmetric bi-matrix game , played in a population setting, players
have access to two pure strategies and a mixed strategy is interpreted as a convex
linear combination of pure strategies. Similar is the case with the players’
strategies in MW scheme where a mixed strategy consists of a convex linear
combination of the players’ actions with two unitary operators .
b) Fitness of a pure strategy can be given a straightforward extension in
MW scheme . It corresponds to a situation when, for example, in the quantum
game, a player uses only one unitary operator out of the two.
c) Theory of ESSs, in the classical domain, deals with anonymous players
possessing discrete number of pure strategies. EWL scheme involves a contin-
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uum of pure quantum strategies . The ESS concept is known to encounter
problems [32] when players possess a continuum of pure strategies.
4.2.1 2× 2 asymmetric games
An ESS is defined as a strict NE [5] for an asymmetric bi-matrix game, i.e. the
game G = (M,N) for which N 6=MT . That is, a strategy pair (⋆x, ⋆y) ∈ S is an
ESS of the game G if PA(
⋆
x,
⋆
y) > PA(x,
⋆
y) and PB(
⋆
x,
⋆
y) > PB(
⋆
x, y) for all x 6= ⋆x
and y 6= ⋆y. For example, the BoS:(
(α, β) (γ, γ)
(γ, γ) (β, α)
)
(27)
where α > β > γ is a asymmetric game with three classical NE [24] given as 1)
⋆
p1 =
⋆
q1 = 0 2)
⋆
p2 =
⋆
q2 = 1 and 3)
⋆
p3 =
α−γ
α+β−2γ ,
⋆
q3 =
β−γ
α+β−2γ . Here the NE 1)
and 2) are also ESS’s but 3) is not because of not being a strict NE. When the
asymmetric game (27) is played with the initial state |ψin〉 = a |S1S1〉+b |S2S2〉,
where S1 and S2 are players’ pure classical strategies, the following three NE
[24] emerge 1)
⋆
p1 =
⋆
q1 = 1 2)
⋆
p2 =
⋆
q2 = 0 and 3)
⋆
p3 =
(α−γ)|a|2+(β−γ)|b|2
α+β−2γ ,
⋆
q3 =
(α−γ)|b|2+(β−γ)|a|2
α+β−2γ . It turns out that, similar to the classical case, the quantum
NE 1) and 2) are ESSs while 3) is not. Now, play thsi game with a different
initial state:
|ψin〉 = a |S1S2〉+ b |S2S1〉 (28)
for which players’ payoffs are:
PA(p, q) = p
{
−q(α+ β − 2γ) + α |a|2 + β |b|2 − γ
}
+
q
{
α |b|2 + β |a|2 − γ
}
+ γ
PB(p, q) = q
{
−p(α+ β − 2γ) + β |a|2 + α |b|2 − γ
}
+
p
{
β |b|2 + α |a|2 − γ
}
+ γ (29)
and there is only one NE i.e.
⋆
p = β|a|
2+α|b|2−γ
α+β−γ ,
⋆
q3 =
α|a|2+β|b|2−γ
α+β−γ , which is not
an ESS. So that, no ESS exists when BoS is played with the state (28).
Consider now another game:(
(α1, α2) (β1, β2)
(γ1, γ2) (σ1, σ2)
)
(30)
for which
(
α1 β1
γ1 σ1
)
6=
(
α2 β2
γ2 σ2
)T
(31)
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and that it is played by using initial state |ψin〉 = a |S1S1〉 + b |S2S2〉 with
|a|2 + |b|2 = 1. Players’ payoffs are:
PA,B(p, q) = α1,2
{
pq |a|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |b|2
}
+ β1,2
{
p(1− q) |a|2 + q(1− p) |b|2
}
+ γ1,2
{
p(1− q) |b|2 + q(1− p) |a|2
}
+ σ1,2
{
pq |b|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |a|2
}
. (32)
The NE conditions are
PA(
⋆
p,
⋆
q)− PA(p, ⋆q) =
(
⋆
p− p)
[
|a|2 (β1 − σ1) + |b|2 (γ1 − α1)− ⋆q {(β1 − σ1) + (γ1 − α1)}
]
≥ 0 (33)
PB(
⋆
p,
⋆
q)− PB(⋆p, q) =
(
⋆
q − q)
[
|a|2 (γ2 − σ2) + |b|2 (β2 − α2)− ⋆p {(γ2 − σ2) + (β2 − α2)}
]
≥ 0. (34)
So that, for
⋆
p =
⋆
q = 0 to be a NE we have
PA(0, 0)− PA(p, 0) = −p
[
(β1 − σ1) + |b|2 {(γ1 − α1)− (β1 − σ1)}
]
≥ 0
PB(0, 0)− PB(0, q) = −q
[
(γ2 − σ2) + |b|2 {(β2 − α2)− (γ2 − σ2)}
]
≥ 0
(35)
and for the strategy pair (0, 0) to be an ESS in the classical game5 we require
PA(0, 0)−PA(p, 0) = −p(β1−σ1) > 0 and PB(0, 0)−PB(0, q) = −q(γ2−σ2) > 0
for all p, q 6= 0. That is, (β1− σ1) < 0 and (γ2− σ2) < 0. For the pair (0, 0) not
to be an ESS for some |b|2 6= 0, let take γ1 = α1 and β2 = α2 and we have
PA(0, 0)− PA(p, 0) = −p(β1 − σ1)
{
1− |b|2
}
PB(0, 0)− PB(0, q) = −q(γ2 − σ2)
{
1− |b|2
}
(36)
i.e. the pair (0, 0) doesn’t remain an ESS at |b|2 = 1. A game having this
property is given by the matrix:(
(1, 1) (1, 2)
(2, 1) (3, 2)
)
. (37)
5which corresponds when |b|2 = 0
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For this game the strategy pair (0, 0) is an ESS when |b|2 = 0 (classical game)
but it is not when for example |b|2 = 12 , though it remains a NE in both the
cases. The example shows a NE switches between ESS and ‘not ESS’ by using
different initial state. In contrast to the last case, one can also find initial states
– different from the one corresponding to the classical game – that turn a NE
strategy pair into an ESS. An example of a game for which it happens is
Alice
S1
S2
Bob
S1 S2(
(2, 1) (1, 0)
(1, 0) (1, 0)
)
. (38)
Playing this game again via the state |ψin〉 = a |S1S1〉 + b |S2S2〉 gives the
following payoff differences for the strategy pair (0, 0):
PA(0, 0)− PA(p, 0) = p |b|2 and PB(0, 0)− PB(0, q) = q |b|2 (39)
for Alice and Bob respectively. Therefore, (38) is an example of a game for
which the pair (0, 0) is not an ESS when the initial state corresponds to the
classical game. But the same pair is an ESS for other initial states for which
0 < |b|2 < 1.
4.2.2 2× 2 symmetric games
Consider now a symmetric bi-matrix game:
Alice
S1
S2
Bob
S1 S2(
(α, α) (β, γ)
(γ, β) (δ, δ)
)
(40)
that is played by an initial state:
|ψin〉 = a |S1S1〉+ b |S2S2〉 , with |a|2 + |b|2 = 1. (41)
Let Alice’s strategy consists of applying the identity operator Iˆ with probability
p and the operator σˆx with probability (1 − p), on the initial state written ρin
in density matrix notation. Similarly Bob applies the operators Iˆ and σˆx with
the probabilities q and (1− q) respectively. The final state is
ρfin =
∑
Uˆ=Iˆ,σˆx
Pr(UˆA) Pr(UˆB)[UˆA ⊗ UˆBρinUˆ †A ⊗ Uˆ †B] (42)
where unitary and Hermitian operator Uˆ is either Iˆ or σˆx. Pr(UˆA), Pr(UˆB) are
the probabilities, for Alice and Bob, respectively, to apply the operator on the
initial state. The matrix ρfin is obtained from ρin by making a convex linear
combination of players’ possible quantum operations. Payoff operators for Alice
and Bob are [24]
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(PA,B)oper = α, α |S1S1〉 〈S1S1|+ β, γ |S1S2〉 〈S1S2|+
γ, β |S2S1〉 〈S2S1|+ δ, δ |S2S2〉 〈S2S2| . (43)
The payoffs are then obtained as mean values of these operators i.e. PA,B =
Tr [(PA,B)operρfin]. Because the quantum game is symmetric with the initial
state (41) and the payoff matrix (40), there is no need for subscripts. We can ,
then, write the payoff to a p-player against a q-player as P (p, q), where the first
number is the focal player’s move. When
⋆
p is a NE we find the following payoff
difference:
P (
⋆
p,
⋆
p)− P (p, ⋆p) = (⋆p− p)[ |a|2 (β − δ)+
|b|2 (γ − α)− ⋆p {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} ]. (44)
Now the ESS conditions for the pure strategy p = 0 are given as
1. |b|2 {(β − δ)− (γ − α)} > (β − δ)
2. If |b|2 {(β − δ)− (γ − α)} = (β − δ)
then q2 {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} > 0 (45)
where 1 is the NE condition. Similarly the ESS conditions for the pure strategy
p = 1 are
1. |b|2 {(γ − α)− (β − δ)} > (γ − α)
2. If |b|2 {(γ − α)− (β − δ)} = (γ − α)
then (1− q)2 {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} > 0. (46)
Because these conditions, for both the pure strategies p = 1 and p = 0, depend
on |b|2, therefore, there can be examples of two-player symmetric games for
which the evolutionary stability of pure strategies can be changed while playing
the game using initial state in the form |ψin〉 = a |S1S1〉 + b |S2S2〉. However,
for the mixed NE, given as
⋆
p = |a|
2(β−δ)+|b|2(γ−α)
(β−δ)+(γ−α) , the corresponding payoff
difference (44) becomes identically zero. From the second condition of an ESS
we find for the mixed NE
⋆
p the difference
P (
⋆
p, q)− P (q, q) = 1
(β − δ) + (γ − α)×
[(β − δ)− q {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} − |b|2 {(β − δ)− (γ − α)} ]2. (47)
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Therefore, the mixed strategy
⋆
p is an ESS when {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} > 0. This
condition, making the mixed NE
⋆
p an ESS, is independent 6 of |b|2. So that, in
this symmetric two-player quantum game, evolutionary stability of the mixed
NE
⋆
p can not be changed when the game is played using initial quantum states
of the form (41).
However, evolutionary stability of pure strategies can be affected, with this
form of the initial states, for two-player symmetric games. Examples of the
games with this property are easy to find. The class of games for which γ = α
and (β − δ) < 0 the strategies p = 0 and p = 1 remain NE for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1];
but the strategy p = 1 is not an ESS when |b|2 = 0 and the strategy p = 0 is
not an ESS when |b|2 = 1.
Consider the symmetric bi-matrix game (40) with the constants α, β, γ, δ
satisfying the conditions:
α, β, γ, δ ≥ 0; (δ − β) > 0; (γ − α) ≥ 0; (γ − α) < (δ − β). (48)
The condition making (p⋆, p⋆) a NE is given by (44). For this game three Nash
equilibria arise i.e. two pure strategies p∗ = 0, p∗ = 1, and one mixed strategy
p∗ = (δ−β)|a|
2−(γ−α)|b|2
(δ−β)−(γ−α) . These three cases are considered below.
Case p⋆ = 0 : For the strategy p⋆ = 0 to be a NE one requires
P (0, 0)− P (p, 0) = p
(γ − α) + (δ − β)
[
|a|2 − (γ − α)
(γ − α) + (δ − β)
]
≥ 0 (49)
and the difference {P (0, 0)− P (p, 0)} > 0 when 1 ≥ |a|2 > (γ−α)(γ−α)+(δ−β) . In
this range of |a|2 the equilibrium p⋆ = 0 is a pure ESS. However, when |a|2 =
(γ−α)
(γ−α)+(δ−β) we have the difference {P (0, 0)− P (p, 0)} identically zero. The
strategy p⋆ = 0 can be an ESS if
P (0, p)− P (p, p)
= p {(γ − α) + (δ − β)}
{
|a|2 − (1 − p)(γ − α) + p(δ − β)
(γ − α) + (δ − β)
}
> 0 (50)
that can be written as
P (0, p)− P (p, p) = p {(γ − α) + (δ − β)}
{
|a|2 −̥
}
> 0 (51)
6An alternative possibility is to adjust |b|2=
(β−δ)−q{(β−δ)+(γ−α)}
{(β−δ)−(γ−α)}
which makes the differ-
ence
n
P (
⋆
p, q)− P (q, q)
o
identically zero. The mixed strategy
⋆
p then does not remain an ESS.
However such ‘mutant dependent’ adjustment of |b|2 is not reasonable because the mutant
strategy q can be anything in the range [0, 1].
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where (γ−α)(γ−α)+(δ−β) ≤ ̥ ≤ (δ−β)(γ−α)+(δ−β) when 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. The strategy p⋆ = 0
can be an ESS only when |a|2 > (δ−β)(γ−α)+(δ−β) which is not possible because
|a|2 is fixed at (γ−α)(γ−α)+(δ−β) . Therefore the strategy p⋆ = 0 is an ESS for 1 ≥
|a|2 > (γ−α)(γ−α)+(δ−β) and for |a|2 = (γ−α)(γ−α)+(δ−β) this NE becomes unstable. The
classical game is obtained by taking |a|2 = 1 for which p⋆ = 0 is an ESS or
a stable NE. However this NE does not remain stable for |a|2 = (γ−α)(γ−α)+(δ−β)
which corresponds to an entangled initial state; though the NE remains intact
in both forms of the game.
Case p⋆ = 1 : Similar to the last case the NE condition for the strategy p⋆ = 1
can be written as
P (1, 1)− P (p, 1) = (1− p)
(γ − α) + (δ − β)
[
− |a|2 + (δ − β)
(γ − α) + (δ − β)
]
≥ 0. (52)
Now p⋆ = 1 is a pure ESS for 0 ≤ |a|2 < (δ−β)(γ−α)+(δ−β) . For |a|
2
= (δ−β)(γ−α)+(δ−β)
the difference {P (1, 1)− P (p, 1)} becomes identically zero. The strategy p⋆ = 1
is an ESS when
P (1, p)− P (p, p)
= (1 − p) {(γ − α) + (δ − β)}
{
− |a|2 + (1− p)(γ − α) + p(δ − β)
(γ − α) + (δ − β)
}
> 0.
(53)
It is possible only if |a|2 < (γ−α)(γ−α)+(δ−β) . Therefore the strategy p⋆ = 1 is a
stable NE (ESS) for 0 ≤ |a|2 < (δ−β)(γ−α)+(δ−β) . It is not stable classically (i.e. for
|a|2 = 1) but becomes stable for an entangled initial state.
Case p⋆ = (δ−β)|a|
2−(γ−α)|b|2
(δ−β)−(γ−α) : In case of the mixed strategy:
p⋆ =
(δ − β) |a|2 − (γ − α) |b|2
(δ − β)− (γ − α) (54)
the NE condition (44) turns into P (p⋆, p⋆)− P (p, p⋆) = 0. The mixed strategy
(54) can be an ESS if
P (p⋆, p)− P (p, p)
= (p⋆ − p)
[
− |a|2 (δ − β) + |b|2 (γ − α) + p {(δ − β)− (γ − α)}
]
> 0
(55)
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for all p 6= p⋆. Write now the strategy p as p = p⋆ +△. For the mixed strategy
(54) the payoff difference of the Eq. (55) is reduced to
P (p⋆, p)− P (p, p) = −△2 {(δ − β)− (γ − α)} . (56)
Hence, for the game defined in the conditions (48), the mixed strategy p⋆ =
(δ−β)|a|2−(γ−α)|b|2
(δ−β)−(γ−α) cannot be an ESS, though it can be a NE of the symmetric
game.
It is to be pointed out that above considerations apply when the game is
played with the initial state (41).
To find examples of symmetric quantum games, where evolutionary stability
of the mixed strategies may also be affected by controlling the initial states, the
number of players are now increased from two to three.
4.2.3 2× 2× 2 symmetric games
In extending the two-player scheme to a three-player case, we assume that three
players A,B, and C play their strategies by applying the identity operator Iˆ
with the probabilities p, q and r respectively on the initial state |ψin〉. Therefore,
they apply the operator σˆx with the probabilities (1 − p), (1 − q) and (1 − r)
respectively. The final state becomes
ρfin =
∑
Uˆ=Iˆ,σˆx
Pr(UˆA) Pr(UˆB) Pr(UˆC)
[
UˆA ⊗ UˆB ⊗ UˆCρinUˆ †A ⊗ Uˆ †B ⊗ Uˆ †C
]
(57)
where the 8 basis vectors are |SiSjSk〉, for i, j, k = 1, 2. Again we use initial
quantum state in the form |ψin〉 = a |S1S1S1〉+b |S2S2S2〉, where |a|2+ |b|2 = 1.
It is a quantum state in 2⊗2⊗2 dimensional Hilbert space that can be prepared
from a system of three two-state quantum systems or qubits. Similar to the two-
player case, the payoff operators for the players A, B, and C can be defined as
(PA,B,C)oper =
α1, β1, η1 |S1S1S1〉 〈S1S1S1|+ α2, β2, η2 |S2S1S1〉 〈S2S1S1|+
α3, β3, η3 |S1S2S1〉 〈S1S2S1|+ α4, β4, η4 |S1S1S2〉 〈S1S1S2|+
α5, β5, η5 |S1S2S2〉 〈S1S2S2|+ α6, β6, η6 |S2S1S2〉 〈S2S1S2|+
α7, β7, η7 |S2S2S1〉 〈S2S2S1|+ α8, β8, η8 |S2S2S2〉 〈S2S2S2| (58)
where αl, βl, ηl for 1 ≤ l ≤ 8 are 24 constants of the matrix of this three-player
game. Payoffs to the players A,B, and C are then obtained as mean values of
these operators i.e. PA,B,C(p, q, r) =Tr[(PA,B,C)operρfin].
Here, similar to the two-player case, the classical payoffs can be obtained
when |b|2 = 0. To get a symmetric game we define PA(x, y, z) as the payoff to
player A when players A, B, and C play the strategies x, y, and z respectively.
With following relations the players’ payoffs become identity-independent.
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PA(x, y, z) = PA(x, z, y) = PB(y, x, z)
= PB(z, x, y) = PC(y, z, x) = PC(z, y, x). (59)
The players in the game then become anonymous and their payoffs depend only
on their strategies. The relations (59) hold with the following replacements for
βi and ηi:
β1 → α1 β2 → α3 β3 → α2 β4 → α3
β5 → α6 β6 → α5 β7 → α6 β8 → α8
η1 → α1 η2 → α3 η3 → α3 η4 → α2
η5 → α6 η6 → α6 η7 → α5 η8 → α8. (60)
Also, it is now necessary that we should have α6 = α7, α3 = α4.
A symmetric game between three players, therefore, can be defined by
only six constants of the payoff matrix . These constants can be taken as
α1, α2, α3, α5, α6, and α8. Payoff to a p-player, when other two players play q
and r, can now be written as P (p, q, r). A symmetric NE
⋆
p is now found from
the Nash condition P (
⋆
p,
⋆
p,
⋆
p)− P (p, ⋆p, ⋆p) ≥ 0 i.e.
P (
⋆
p,
⋆
p,
⋆
p)− P (p, ⋆p, ⋆p) = (⋆p− p)[⋆p2(1 − 2 |b|2)(σ + ω − 2η)+
2
⋆
p
{
|b|2 (σ + ω − 2η)− ω + η
}
+
{
ω − |b|2 (σ + ω)
}
] ≥ 0 (61)
where (α1 − α2) = σ, (α3 − α6) = η,and (α5 − α8) = ω.
Three possible NE are found as
⋆
p1 =
{(ω−η)−|b|2(σ+ω−2η)}±√{(σ+ω)2−(2η)2}|b|2(1−|b|2)+(η2−σω)
(1−2|b|2)(σ+ω−2η)
⋆
p2 = 0
⋆
p3 = 1

 . (62)
It is observed that the mixed NE
⋆
p1 makes the difference
{
P (
⋆
p,
⋆
p,
⋆
p)− P (p, ⋆p, ⋆p)
}
identically zero and two values for
⋆
p1 can be found for a given |b|2. Apart from
⋆
p1 the other two NE (i.e.
⋆
p2 and
⋆
p3) are pure strategies. Also now
⋆
p1 comes
out a NE without imposing further restrictions on the matrix of the symmetric
three-player game. However, the pure strategies
⋆
p2 and
⋆
p3 can be NE when
further restriction are imposed on the matrix of the game. For example,
⋆
p3 can
be a NE provided σ ≥ (ω + σ) |b|2 for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly ⋆p2 can be NE
when ω ≤ (ω + σ) |b|2.
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Now we address the question: How evolutionary stability of these three NE
can be affected while playing the game via initial quantum states given in the
following form?
|ψin〉 = a |S1S1S1〉+ b |S2S2S2〉 . (63)
For the two-player asymmetric game of BoS we showed that out of three NE
only two can be evolutionarily stable. In classical evolutionary game theory the
concept of an ESS is well-known [33, 34] to be extendable to multi-player case.
When mutants are allowed to play only one strategy the definition of an ESS
for the three-player case is written as [33]
1. P (p, p, p) > P (q, p, p)
2. If P (p, p, p) = P (q, p, p) then P (p, q, p) > P (q, q, p). (64)
Here p is a NE if it satisfies the condition 1 against all q 6= p. For our case the
ESS conditions for the pure strategies
⋆
p2 and
⋆
p3 can be written as follows. For
example
⋆
p2 = 0 is an ESS when
1. σ |b|2 > ω |a|2
2. If σ |b|2 = ω |a|2 then − ηq2(|a|2 − |b|2) > 0 (65)
where 1 is NE condition for the strategy
⋆
p2 = 0. Similarly,
⋆
p3 = 1 is an ESS
when
1. σ |a|2 > ω |b|2
2. If σ |a|2 = ω |b|2 then η(1− q)2(|a|2 − |b|2) > 0 (66)
and both the pure strategies
⋆
p2 and
⋆
p3 are ESSs when |a|2 = |b|2. The conditions
(66) can also be written as
1. σ > (ω + σ) |b|2
2. If σ = |b|2 (ω + σ) then γ(ω − σ)
(ω + σ)
> 0. (67)
For the strategy
⋆
p2 = 0 the ESS conditions (65) reduce to
1. ω < (ω + σ) |b|2
2. If ω = |b|2 (ω + σ) then γ(ω − σ)
(ω + σ)
> 0 (68)
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Examples of three-player symmetric games are easy to find for which a pure
strategy is a NE for the whole range |b|2 ∈ [0, 1], but it is not an ESS for some
particular value of |b|2. An example of a class of such games is for which σ = 0,
ω < 0, and η ≤ 0. In this class the strategy ⋆p2 = 0 is a NE for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1]
but not an ESS when |b|2 = 1.
Apart from the pure strategies, the mixed strategy equilibrium
⋆
p1 forms the
most interesting case. It makes the payoff difference
{
P (
⋆
p1,
⋆
p1,
⋆
p1)− P (p, ⋆p1, ⋆p1)
}
identically zero for every strategy p. The strategy
⋆
p1 is an ESS when
{
P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1)− P (q, q, ⋆p1)
}
>
0 but
P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1)− P (q, q, ⋆p1)
= ±( ⋆p1 − q)2
√
{(σ + ω)2 − (2η)2} |b|2 (1− |b|2) + (η2 − σω). (69)
Therefore, out of the two possible roots (
⋆
p1)1 and (
⋆
p1)2 of the quadratic equa-
tion7:
⋆
p1
2
(1− 2 |b|2)(σ + ω − 2η)+
2
⋆
p1
{
|b|2 (σ + ω − 2η)− ω + η
}
+
{
ω − |b|2 (σ + ω)
}
= 0 (70)
only (
⋆
p1)1 can exist as an ESS. When the square root term in the equation (69)
becomes zero we have only one mixed NE, which is not an ESS. Hence, out of
four possible NE in this three-player game only three can be ESSs.
An interesting class of three-player games is the one for which η2 = σω. For
these games the mixed NE are
⋆
p1 =
{
(w − η)− |b|2 (σ + ω − 2η)
}
± |a| |b| |σ − ω|
(1− 2 |b|2)(σ + ω − 2η) (71)
and, when played classically, we can get only one mixed NE that is not an ESS.
However for all |b|2, different from zero, we generally obtain two NE out of which
one can be an ESS.
Similar to the two-player case, the equilibria in a three-player symmetric
game where quantization affects evolutionary stability, are the ones that survive
for two initial states, one of which is a product state and corresponds to the
classical game. Suppose
⋆
p1 remains a NE for |b|2 = 0 and some other non-zero
|b|2. It is possible when (σ − ω)(2 ⋆p1 − 1) = 0. Alternatively, the strategy ⋆p = 12
remains a NE for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1]. It reduces the defining quadratic equation (70)
7These roots make the difference
n
P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1)− P (q, q,
⋆
p1)
o
greater than and less than
zero, respectively.
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for
⋆
p1 to σ + ω + 2η = 0 and makes the difference
{
P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1)− P (q, q, ⋆p1)
}
independent of |b|2. Therefore the strategy ⋆p = 12 , even when it is retained as
an equilibrium for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1], cannot be an ESS in only one version of the
symmetric three-player game. For the second possibility σ = ω the defining
equation for
⋆
p1 is reduced to
(1−2 |b|2)
{
⋆
p1 − (η − σ)−
√
η2 − σ2
2(η − σ)
}{
⋆
p1 − (η − σ) +
√
η2 − σ2
2(η − σ)
}
= 0 (72)
for which
P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1)− P (q, q, ⋆p1) = ±2( ⋆p1 − q)2
∣∣∣∣|b|2 − 12
∣∣∣∣√η2 − σ2. (73)
Here the difference
{
P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1)− P (q, q, ⋆p1)
}
still depends on |b|2 and becomes
zero for |b|2 = 1/2.
Hence, for the class of games for which σ = ω and η > σ, one of the mixed
strategies (
⋆
p1)1, (
⋆
p1)2 remains a NE for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1] but not an ESS when
|b|2 = 1/2. In this class of three-player quantum games the evolutionary stability
of a mixed strategy can, therefore, be changed while the game is played using
initial quantum states in the form (63).
4.2.4 Rock-Scissors-Paper game
Rock-Scissors-Paper (RSP) is a game for two players that is typically played
using the players’ hands. This game has been played for long as a children’s
pastime or as an odd-man-out selection process. The players opposite each
others, tap their fist in their open palm three times (saying Rock, Scissors,
Paper) and then show one of three possible gestures. The Rock wins against
the scissors (crushes it) but looses against the paper (is wrapped into it). The
Scissors wins against the paper (cuts it) but looses against the rock (is crushed
by it). The Paper wins against the rock (wraps it) but looses against the scissors
(is cut by it). The game is also played in nature like many other games. Lizards
in the Coast Range of California play this game [35] using three alternative male
strategies locked in an ecological never ending process from which there seems
little escape.
In a slightly modified version of the RSP game both players get a small
premium ǫ for a draw. This game can be represented by the payoff matrix :
R
S
P
R S P
 −ǫ 1 −1−1 −ǫ 1
1 −1 −ǫ

 (74)
where −1 < ǫ ≤ 0. The matrix of the usual game is obtained when ǫ is zero.
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One cannot win if one’s opponent knew which strategy was going to be
picked. For example, picking Rock consistently all the opponent needs to do
is pick Paper and s/he would win. Players find soon that in case predicting
opponent’s strategy is not possible the best strategy is to pick Rock, Scissors,
or Paper at random. In other words, the player selects Rock, Scissors, or Paper
with a probability of 1/3. In case opponent’s strategy is predictable picking a
strategy at random with a probability of 1/3 is not the best thing to do unless
the opponent does the same [20].
Analysis [5] of the modified RSP game of matrix (74) shows that its NE con-
sists of playing each of the three different pure strategies with a fixed equilibrial
probability 1/3. However it is not an ESS because ǫ is negative.
Here we want to study the effects of quantization on evolutionary stability for
the modified RSP game. The game is different, from others considered earlier,
because classically each player now possesses three pure strategies instead of
two. A classical mixed NE exists which is not an ESS. Our motivation is to
explore the possibility that the classical mixed NE becomes an ESS for some
quantum form of the game.
Quantization of Rock-Scissors-Paper game: Using simpler notation: R ∼
1, S ∼ 2, P ∼ 3 we quantize this game via MW scheme [24]. We assume the
two players are in possession of three unitary and Hermitian operators Iˆ , Cˆ and
Dˆ defined as follows.
Iˆ |1〉 = |1〉 , Cˆ |1〉 = |3〉 , Dˆ |1〉 = |2〉
Iˆ |2〉 = |2〉 , Cˆ |2〉 = |2〉 , Dˆ |2〉 = |1〉
Iˆ |3〉 = |3〉 , Cˆ |3〉 = |1〉 , Dˆ |3〉 = |3〉 (75)
where Cˆ† = Cˆ = Cˆ−1 and Dˆ† = Dˆ = Dˆ−1 and Iˆ is the identity operator.
Consider a general two-player payoff matrix when each player has three
strategies:
1
2
3
1 2 3
 (α11, β11) (α12, β12) (α13, β13)(α21, β21) (α22, β22) (α23, β23)
(α31, β31) (α32, β32) (α33, β33)

 (76)
where αij and βij are the payoffs to Alice and Bob, respectively, when Alice
plays i and Bob plays j and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3. Suppose Alice and Bob apply the
operators Cˆ, Dˆ, and Iˆ with the probabilities p, p1, (1 − p − p1) and q, q1,
(1 − q − q1) respectively. The initial state of the game is ρin. Alice’s move
changes the state changes to
A
ρin = (1− p− p1)IˆAρinIˆ†A + pCˆAρinCˆ†A + p1DˆAρinDˆ†A. (77)
The final state, after Bob too has played his move, is
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A,B
ρf = (1 − q − q1)IˆB AρinIˆ†B + qCˆB
A
ρinCˆ
†
B + q1DˆB
A
ρinDˆ
†
B. (78)
This state can be written as
A,B
ρf = (1− p− p1)(1 − q − q1)
{
IˆA ⊗ IˆBρinIˆ†A ⊗ Iˆ†B
}
+ p(1− q − q1)×{
CˆA ⊗ IˆBρinCˆ†A ⊗ Iˆ†B
}
+ p1(1− q − q1)
{
DˆA ⊗ IˆBρinDˆ†A ⊗ Iˆ†B
}
+
(1− p− p1)q
{
IˆA ⊗ CˆBρinIˆ†A ⊗ Cˆ†B
}
+ pq
{
CˆA ⊗ CˆBρinCˆ†A ⊗ Cˆ†B
}
+
p1q
{
DˆA ⊗ CˆBρinDˆ†A ⊗ Cˆ†B
}
+ (1− p− p1)q1
{
IˆA ⊗ DˆBρinIˆ†A ⊗ Dˆ†B
}
+ pq1
{
CˆA ⊗ DˆBρinCˆ†A ⊗ Dˆ†B
}
+ p1q1
{
DˆA ⊗ DˆBρinDˆ†A ⊗ Dˆ†B
}
. (79)
The nine basis vectors of initial quantum state with three pure classical strate-
gies are |ij〉 for i, j = 1, 2, 3. We consider the initial state to be a pure quantum
state of two qutrits i.e.
|ψin〉 =
∑
i,j=1,2,3
cij |ij〉 , where
∑
i,j=1,2,3
|cij |2 = 1. (80)
The payoff operators for Alice and Bob are [24]
(PA,B)oper = (α, β)11 |11〉 〈11|+ (α, β)12 |12〉 〈12|+ (α, β)13 |13〉 〈13|+
(α, β)21 |21〉 〈21|+ (α, β)22 |22〉 〈22|+ (α, β)23 |23〉 〈23|+
(α, β)31 |31〉 〈31|+ (α, β)32 |32〉 〈32|+ (α, β)33 |33〉 〈33| .
(81)
The players’ payoffs are then
PA,B = Tr[{(PA,B)oper}A,Bρf ] (82)
Payoff to Alice, for example, can be written as
PA = ΦΩΥ
T (83)
where T is for transpose, and the matrices Φ, Ω, and Υ are
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Φ = [ (1 − p− p1)(1− q − q1) p(1− q − q1) p1(1− q − q1)
(1− p− p1)q pq p1q (1 − p− p1)q1 pq1 p1q1 ]
Υ = [ α11 α12 α13 α21 α22 α23 α31 α32 α33 ]
Ω =


|c11|2 |c12|2 |c13|2 |c21|2 |c22|2 |c23|2 |c31|2 |c32|2 |c33|2
|c31|2 |c32|2 |c33|2 |c21|2 |c22|2 |c23|2 |c11|2 |c12|2 |c13|2
|c21|2 |c22|2 |c23|2 |c11|2 |c12|2 |c13|2 |c31|2 |c32|2 |c33|2
|c13|2 |c12|2 |c11|2 |c23|2 |c22|2 |c21|2 |c33|2 |c32|2 |c31|2
|c33|2 |c32|2 |c31|2 |c23|2 |c22|2 |c21|2 |c13|2 |c12|2 |c11|2
|c23|2 |c22|2 |c21|2 |c13|2 |c12|2 |c11|2 |c33|2 |c32|2 |c31|2
|c12|2 |c11|2 |c13|2 |c22|2 |c21|2 |c23|2 |c32|2 |c31|2 |c33|2
|c32|2 |c31|2 |c33|2 |c22|2 |c21|2 |c23|2 |c12|2 |c11|2 |c13|2
|c22|2 |c21|2 |c23|2 |c12|2 |c11|2 |c13|2 |c32|2 |c31|2 |c33|2


.
(84)
The payoff (83) corresponds to the matrix (76). Payoffs in classical mixed
strategy game can be obtained from Eq. (82) for the initial state |ψin〉 = |11〉.
The game is symmetric when αij = βji in the matrix (76). The quantum
game played using the quantum state (80) is symmetric when |cij |2 = |cji|2 for
all constants cij in the state (80). These two conditions together guarantee a
symmetric quantum game. The players’ payoffs PA, PB then do not need a
subscript and we can simply use P (p, q) to denote the payoff to the p-player
against the q-player.
The question of evolutionary stability in quantized RSP game is addressed
below.
Analysis of evolutionary stability: Assume a strategy is defined by a pair
of numbers (p, p1) for players playing the quantized RSP game. These numbers
are the probabilities with which the player applies the operators Cˆ and Dˆ. The
identity operator Iˆ is, then, applied with probability (1 − p − p1). Similar to
the conditions a) and b) in Eq. (2), the conditions making a strategy (p⋆, p⋆1)
an ESS can be written as [17, 5]
1. P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p⋆, p⋆1)} > P{(p, p1), (p⋆, p⋆1)}
2. if P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p⋆, p⋆1)} = P{(p, p1), (p⋆, p⋆1)} then
P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p, p1)} > P{(p, p1), (p, p1)}. (85)
Suppose (p⋆, p⋆1) is a mixed NE then{
∂P
∂p
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p
⋆
1
(p⋆ − p) + ∂P
∂p1
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p
⋆
1
(p⋆1 − p1)
}
≥ 0. (86)
Using substitutions
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|c11|2 − |c31|2 = △1, |c21|2 − |c11|2 = △´1
|c13|2 − |c33|2 = △2, |c22|2 − |c12|2 = △´2
|c12|2 − |c32|2 = △3, |c23|2 − |c13|2 = △´3
(87)
we get
∂P
∂p
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p
⋆
1
= p⋆(△1 −△2) {(α11 + α33)− (α13 + α31)}+
p⋆1(△1 −△3) {(α11 + α32)− (α12 + α31)}−
△1 (α11 − α31)−△2(α13 − α33)−△3(α12 − α32), (88)
∂P
∂p1
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p
⋆
1
= p⋆(△´3 −△´1) {(α11 + α23)− (α13 + α21)}+
p⋆1(△´2 −△´1) {(α11 + α22)− (α12 + α21)}+
△´1 (α11 − α21) +△´2(α12 − α22) +△´3(α13 − α23). (89)
For the matrix (74) the equations (88, 89) can be written as
∂P
∂p
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p
⋆
1
= △1 {−2ǫp⋆ − (3 + ǫ)p⋆1 + (1 + ǫ)}+
△2 {2ǫp⋆ + (1− ǫ)}+△3 {(3 + ǫ)p⋆1 − 2} (90)
∂P
∂p1
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p
⋆
1
= △´1 {−p⋆(3− ǫ) + 2ǫp⋆1 + (1 − ǫ)}−
△´2 {2ǫp⋆1 − (1 + ǫ)}+△´3 {(3− ǫ)p⋆ − 2} . (91)
The payoff difference in the second condition of an ESS given in the Eq. (85)
reduces to
P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p, p1)} − P{(p, p1), (p, p1)}
= (p⋆ − p)[−△1 {2ǫp+ (3 + ǫ)p1 − (1 + ǫ)}+
△2 {2ǫp+ (1− ǫ)}+△3{(3 + ǫ)p1 − 2}]+
(p⋆1 − p1)[−△´1 {(3− ǫ)p− 2ǫp1 − (1− ǫ)}−
△´2 {2ǫp1 − (1 + ǫ)}+△´3{(3− ǫ)p− 2}]. (92)
With the substitutions (p⋆−p) = x and (p⋆1−p1) = y the above payoff difference
is
P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p, p1)} − P{(p, p1), (p, p1)}
= △1x {2ǫx+ (3 + ǫ)y} −△2(2ǫx2)−△3xy(3 + ǫ)−
△´1 y {2ǫy − (3 − ǫ)x}+△´2(2ǫy2)−△´3xy(3 − ǫ) (93)
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provided that
∂P
∂p
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p
⋆
1
= 0
∂P
∂p1
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p
⋆
1
= 0. (94)
The conditions in Eq. (94) together define the mixed NE (p⋆, p⋆1). Consider now
the modified RSP game in classical form obtained by setting |c11|2 = 1. The
Eqs. (94) become
−2ǫp⋆ − (ǫ + 3)p⋆1 + (ǫ+ 1) = 0
(−ǫ+ 3)p⋆ − 2ǫp⋆1 + (ǫ− 1) = 0 (95)
and p⋆ = p⋆1 =
1
3 is obtained as a mixed NE for all the range −1 < ǫ < 0. From
Eq. (93) we get
P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p, p1)} − P{(p, p1), (p, p1)}
= 2ǫ(x2 + y2 + xy) = ǫ
{
(x+ y)2 + (x2 + y2)
} ≤ 0. (96)
In the classical RSP game, therefore, the mixed NE p⋆ = p⋆1 =
1
3 is a NE but
not an ESS, because the second condition of an ESS given in the Eq. (85) does
not hold.
Now define a new initial state as
|ψin〉 = 1
2
{|12〉+ |21〉+ |13〉+ |31〉} (97)
and use it to play the game, instead of the classical game obtained from |ψin〉 =
|11〉. The strategy p⋆ = p⋆1 = 13 still forms a mixed NE because the conditions
(94) hold true for it. However the payoff difference of Eq. (93) is now given
below, when −1 < ǫ < 0 and x, y 6= 0:
P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p, p1)} − P{(p, p1), (p, p1)}
= −ǫ{(x+ y)2 + (x2 + y2)} > 0. (98)
Therefore, the mixed NE p⋆ = p⋆1 =
1
3 , not existing as an ESS in the classical
form of the RSP game, becomes an ESS when the game is quantized and played
using an initial (entangled) quantum state given by the Eq. (97).
Note that from Eq. (82) the sum of the payoffs to Alice and Bob (PA+PB)
can be obtained for both the classical mixed strategy game (i.e. when |ψin〉 =
|11〉) and the quantum game played using the quantum state of Eq. (97). For
the matrix (74) we write these sums as (PA+PB)cl and (PA+PB)qu for classical
mixed strategy and quantum games, respectively. We obtain
(PA + PB)cl = −2ǫ {(1− p− p1)(1 − q − q1) + p1q1 + pq} (99)
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and
(PA + PB)qu = −
{
1
2
(PA + PB)cl + ǫ
}
. (100)
In case ǫ = 0 both the classical and quantum games are clearly zero sum. For
the slightly modified version of the RSP game we have −1 < ǫ < 0 and both
versions of the game become non zero-sum.
5 Concluding Remarks
Evolutionary stability is a game-theoretic solution concept that tells which
strategies are going to establish themselves in a population of players engaged in
symmetric contests. By establishing itself it means that the strategy becomes
resistent to invasion by mutant strategies when played by a small number of
players. Analysis of evolutionary stability in quantum games shows that quan-
tization of games, played by a population of players, can lead to new stable states
of the population in which, for example, a quantum strategy establishes itself.
Our results show that quantum strategies can indeed change the dynamics of
evolution as described by the concept of evolutionary stability. Quantum strate-
gies being able to decide evolutionary outcomes clearly gives a new role to quan-
tum mechanics which is higher than just keeping the atoms together. Secondly,
evolutionary stability in quantum games provides a mathematically tractable
method of analysis for studying multi-player quantum games [36] played in evo-
lutionary arrangements.
Using EWL and MW quantization schemes , we explored how quantization
can change evolutionary stability of Nash equilibria in certain asymmetric bi-
matrix games. The ESS concept was originally defined for symmetric bi-matrix
contests. We showed that quantization can change evolutionary stability of
a NE also in certain types of symmetric bi-matrix games. We identified the
classes of games, both symmetric and asymmetric, for which within the EWL
and MW schemes the quantization of games becomes related to evolutionary
stability of NE. For example, in the case of Prisoners’ Dilemma we found that
when a population is engaged in playing this symmetric bi-matrix game, a small
number of mutant players can invade the classical ESS8 when they exploit Eisert
and Wilken’s two-parameter set of quantum strategies. As another example
we studied the well-known childrens’ two-player three-strategy game of Rock-
Scissors-Paper. In its classical form a mixed NE exists that is not evolutionarily
stable. We found that in a quantum form of this game, played using MW
quantization scheme , the classical NE becomes evolutionarily stable when the
players share an entangled state.
We speculate that evolutionary stability in quantum games can potentially
provide a new approach towards the understanding of rise of complexity and
self-organization in groups of quantum-interacting entities, although this opin-
ion, at the present stage of development in evolutionary quantum game theory
8consisting of Defection-Defection strategy pair
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, remains without any supportive evidence, either empirical or experimental.
However, it seems that the work presented in this chapter provides a theoret-
ical support in favor of this opinion. Secondly, evolutionary quantum game
theory benefits from the methods and concepts of quantum mechanics and evo-
lutionary game theory, the second of which is well known to facilitate better
understanding of complex interactions taking place in communities of animals
as well as that of the bacteria and viruses. Combining together the techniques
and approaches of these two, seemingly separate, disciplines appears to provide
an ideal arrangement to understand the rise of complexity and self-organization
at molecular level.
Although it is true that evolutionary stability and evolutionary computation
provide two different perspectives on the dynamics of evolution, it appears to
us that an evolutionary quantum game-theoretic approach can potentially pro-
vide an alternative viewpoint in finding evolutionary quantum search algorithms
that may combine the advantages of quantum and evolutionary computing [37].
This will then also provide the opportunity to combine the two different philoso-
phies representing these approaches towards computing: evolutionary search
and quantum computing.
References
[1] J. von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Be-
haviour, Princeton (1953).
[2] E. Rasmusen, Games and Information, Blackwell, Cambridge MA, (1989).
[3] J. Maynard Smith, Evolution and the theory of games, CUP (1982).
[4] J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Evolutionary Games and Population Dynam-
ics, Cambridge University Press (1998).
[5] J. W. Weibull, Evolutionary game theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge
(1995).
[6] P. E. Turner and L. Chao. Nature 398, 111 (1999).
[7] J. Nash, Proc. of the National Academy of Sciences 36, 48 (1950).
[8] J. Nash, Ann. Math. 54, 287-295. MR 13:261g (1951).
[9] See for example R. B. Myerson, Int. J. Game Theo. 7, 73 (1978) and J. C.
Harsanyi, R. Selten, A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games,
The MIT Press, (1988).
[10] D. A. Meyer, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82, 1052 (1999).
[11] J. Eisert, M. Wilkins, and M. Lewenstein, Phy. Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999).
[12] J. Eisert and M. Wilkens, J. Quantum Games. Mod. Opt. 47, 2543 (2000).
33
[13] M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang, Quantum Computation and Quantum
Information, Cambridge University Press (2000); C. P. Williams, S. H.
Clearwater, Explorations in Quantum Computing, Springer-Verlag, New
York, Inc. (1998).
[14] For a review see the references within: Adrian Flitney,
PhD Thesis, University of Adelaide, 2005, available at:
http://library.adelaide.edu.au/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=1165901;
and Azhar Iqbal, PhD Thesis Quaid-i-Azam University, 2004, available at:
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0503176.
[15] R. A. Fisher, The Genetic Theory of Natural Selection, Clarendon Press,
Oxford (1930).
[16] See the article in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy on Evolutionary Game Theory, available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-evolutionary/.
[17] J. Maynard Smith, G. R. Price, Nature 246, 15-18. (1973).
[18] I. M. Bomze, Cent. Europ. J. Oper. Res. Eco., Vol. 4/1, 25 (1996).
[19] I. M. Bomze, B. M. Po¨tscher, Game theoretical foundations of evolutionary
stability. Lecture notes in Economics and Mathematical systems, No. 324,
Springer Verlag, Berlin (1989).
[20] K. Prestwich, Game Theory, A report submitted to the Department of
Biology, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA, USA 01610. Available at
http://www.holycross.edu/departments/biology/kprestwi/behavior/ESS/pdf/games.pdf
[21] R. Cressman, The stability concept of evolutionary game theory, Springer
Verlag, Berlin (1992).
[22] G. van der Laan and X. Tieman, Evolutionary game theory and the Mod-
elling of Economic Behaviour, A report presented to research program
“Competition and Cooperation” of the Faculty of Economics and Econo-
metrics, Free University, Amsterdam, November 6, 1996. Available online
at http://www.tinbergen.nl/discussionpapers/96172.pdf.
[23] J. Nash, Non-cooperative games, Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University
(1950).
[24] L. Marinatto and T. Weber, Phys. Lett. A 272, 291 (2000).
[25] S. C. Benjamin, Physics Letters A 277, 180 (2000).
[26] L. Marinatto and T. Weber, Phys. Lett. A 277, 183 (2000).
[27] S. C. Benjamin, P. M. Hayden, Phys. Rev. Lett. 87, 069801 (2001).
34
[28] J. Eisert, M. Wilkens, andM. Lewenstein, “Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein
Reply:”, Phys. Rev. Lett. 87, 069802 (2001).
[29] See for example D. Friedman, J. Evol. Econ. 8, 15 (1998) and references
within.
[30] See for example J. Evol. Econ, Springer-Verlag.
[31] L. Demetrius, V. Matthias Gundlach, Mathematical Biosciences 168, 9-38
(2000).
[32] J. Oechssler and F. Riedel. Discussion paper 7/2000, Bonn Graduate School
of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn,
http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/papers/liste.html#2000.
[33] M. Broom, C. Canning, and G. T. Vickers. Bull. Math. Bio. 62, 451 (2000).
[34] M. Broom, C. Cannings, and G. T. Vickers. Multi-player matrix games,
Bulletin of Mathematical Biology 59, 931-952 (1997).
[35] I. Peterson, Lizard Game, Available at
http://www.maa.org/mathland/mathland 4 15.html
[36] S. C. Benjamin and P. M. Hayden, Phy. Rev. A64, 030301 (2001).
[37] G. Greenwood, Congress on Evol. Comp. 2001, pp. 815-822 (2001).
35
Index
Battle of Sexes (BoS), 6, 7
Bi-matrix game, 4, 5, 15
Classical game theory, 4
Complexity and self-organization, 33
Correlated equilibrium, 2
Darwinian fitness, 2
Darwinian natural selection, 5
Density matrix, 19
Dominant strategy, 2
Entanglement, 7
Equilibrium, 3
ESS, 2–5, 10, 11
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, 2
Evolutionary computing, 34
Evolutionary dynamics, 3
Evolutionary economics, 10
Evolutionary entropy, 15
Evolutionary game theory, 2–5
Evolutionary quantum game theory, 33
Evolutionary search, 34
Evolutionary stability, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11,
13, 15
EWL quantization scheme, 6, 7, 9, 11,
16, 33
Fisher, 3
Fitness of a strategy, 4
Game theory, 2, 3
Genome, 4
Genotype, 3
Hermitian operator, 19, 27
Hilbert space, 6, 7, 23
Invasion barrier, 4
John Nash, 5
Local actions
on a qubit, 7
Mathematical biology, 10
Maynard Smith, 3
Measure of entanglement, 13, 15
Mixed strategy, 4
Morgenstern O., 2
Multi-player quantum games, 33
Mutant strategy, 4, 12, 13
MW quantization scheme, 6, 7, 9, 15,
16, 27, 33
Nash equilibrium, 2
Nash’s PhD thesis, 5
Natural selection, 3, 5
Neumann v. J, 2
Non-cooperative game theory, 10
One-parameter strategy set, 6
Pair-wise contest, 4, 5
Pareto optimal, 7
Pauli spin-flip operator, 8
Payoff matrix, 4, 19, 23, 27, 28
Payoff operators, 8, 19, 23, 29
Perfect equilibrium, 2
Player interaction, 4
Population setting, 5
Population-statistical setting, 5
PQ penny flip game, 6
Price G. R., 3
Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD), 6
Pure states, 9
Quantization of a game, 2, 15
Quantum Battle of Sexes, 7
Quantum entanglement, 10, 11, 15
Quantum game theory, 2
Quantum games, 2, 3, 6, 10
Quantum information and computation,
2
Quantum mechanics, 10, 33
Quantum mutants, 12
Quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma, 6
Quantum strategy, 7, 10, 11, 16, 33
Qubit, 6, 7
36
Refinement of Nash equilibrium, 2
Relative negentropy, 15
Replicator dynamics, 5
Rest points of replicator dynamics, 5
Rock-Scissors-Paper (RSP) game, 27
Sequential equilibrium, 2
Sex ratio, 3
Stern-Gerlach detectors, 6
Strategy, 3, 4
Strategy set, 3
Symmetric game, 4
Tactics, 7
Tensor-product space, 6
Two-parameter strategy set, 6
Unitary operator, 6, 7, 16
37
Biographies:
Azhar Iqbal graduated in Physics in 1995 from the University of Sheffield,
UK. From 1995 to 2002 he was associated with the Pakistan Institute of Lasers
& Optics. He earned his PhD from the University of Hull, UK, in 2006 in
the area of quantum games. He is Assistant Professor (on leave) at the Na-
tional University of Sciences and Technology, Pakistan and Visiting Associate
Professor at the Kochi University of Technology, Japan.
Taksu Cheon graduated in Physics in 1980 from the University of Tokyo,
Japan. He earned his PhD from the University of Tokyo in 1985 in the area of
theoretical nuclear physics. He is Professor of Theoretical Physics at the Kochi
University of Technology, Japan.
38
